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Decades of Soviet Spies Defy West German Damage Control

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WASHINGTON

The recent discovery of Hans Joachim Tiedge, Margarete Hoeke and other Soviet satellite spies in the West German government and the recent discoveries of Soviet-American spies John Walker in the U.S. Navy and Richard Miller in the FBI are symptoms of espionage cancer in both countries. The cancer is caused by the Soviet Union and fed by the stupidity and corruption of the West German and U.S. political and intellectual Establishments. If the malignancy of the espionage cancer becomes even more evident, the two Establishments will not control it. The record of 40 years shows that they will make it worse.

In July, 1954, Otto John, the head of the West German government's internal security organization, disappeared from West Berlin and reappeared, several

weeks later, at a Soviet-controlled press conference in East Berlin. John had been appointed in 1950 by the West German minister of the interior, with the approval of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and of the American, British and French high commissioners for West Germany. Whether John carelessly let himself be drugged and kidnaped, as he later claimed, or whether he treacherously defected, as his political enemies asserted, his choice and retention as the J. Edgar Hoover of West Germany was a blunder on the part of the West German and Allied political Establishments.

In October, 1969, Willy Brandt became the West German chancellor. His sneaky genius was Egon Bahr. Under Bahr's influence, Brandt tried to appease the Soviet Union. In 1970, Brandt signed treaties of cooperation and nonaggression with the Soviet Union and Poland. In 1972, he signed a treaty with, and thereby recognized, the Soviet satellite government of East Germany. Brandt was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, and Time magazine named him "Man of the Year."

The Soviet Union did not honor Brandt. Instead, they recruited another

of his top aides, Guenter Guillaume, as a spy. In late 1972, when evidence of Guillaume's espionage was presented to Brandt, he ordered it suppressed. In May, 1974, the evidence of Guillaume's espionage and Brandt's cover-up became undeniable; Brandt was forced to resign. Establishment commentators called his action a noble gesture. The Soviets did not deny that Guillaume was their man.

Nonetheless, the U.S. political Establishment followed Bahr and Brandt with continuing attempts to pacify the Soviets. Former Sen. John Sherman Cooper went to East Berlin as the first American ambassador. The East German government was allowed to set up an embassy in Washington.

Late last year, Helmut Kohl, the current chancellor of West Germany, sought to have Erich Honecker, the boss of communist East Germany, visit him in Bonn. More recently, Brandt, coming back like Richard M. Nixon, planned to visit East Germany with Franz Josef Strauss, the Bavarian political leader. These gestures were approved by genteel Americans, but they did not curb the

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new Soviet-German espionage in the office of the West German president and other West German government agencies.

These days, the intellectual Establishment is explaining why the American Walkers and the German Tiedges and Hoekes spy for the Soviet Union and its satellites: the idealistic urge to promote peace, resentment, ego trips, thrill-seeking, emotional imbalance, sex, liquor, real need of money, greed. However, the fundamental reason why Americans, Germans and others spy for the Soviet Union is the Soviet Union. Without the Soviet Union and its satellites to lure them, recruit them, train them, run them and pay them, the Walkers, Tiedges, Hoekes and others would have no jobs as spies.

One way to counter Soviet espionage is to cut to the barest minimum the size of Soviet and Soviet satellite embassies, consulates and other missions. For example, the Soviet Union has been permitted to build a huge new embassy complex in Washington. The U.S. State Department allows 320 Soviets to staff this embassy and the consulate in San Francisco. Add to this the staffs of the Soviet satellite embassies, Soviet agents in other embassies, the United Nations, other international organizations and those without diplomatic status and you potentially have an army of Soviet agents and agent handlers on U.S. soil. It stretches U.S. counterintelligence resources pitifully thin.

The offensive, rather than defensive, way to counter Soviet espionage is to recruit more and better people for U.S., German and other Western intelligence and counterintelligence agencies. Such recruitment will go much better if potential recruits received social approval and intellectual encouragement for intelligence careers. For 40 years, the United States and other Establishments have scorned intelligence professionals and intelligence work. They will approve and

encourage intelligence when, as Nikita S. Khrushchev liked to say, "shrimps learn to whistle."

Controlling Soviet espionage in West Germany is especially difficult. East Germans who come to the West readily receive full citizenship and all civil rights, on the grounds that all Germans are members of one nation. The concepts of civil rights, as a reaction to Nazism, are extraordinarily liberal: Breathalyzer tests are seldom administered to drunks let alone security tests to suspects. Ideology plays an intense role in people's lives—they will spy out of misguided idealism and not for money. Also Germans and their Soviet handlers are very patient: A German spy may lie doggo for many years, slowly working his way up to a position where he has access to secrets.

Under these circumstances, espionage damage control in West Germany requires a much larger counterintelligence force than currently exists. Since the Soviets put a priority on the penetration of German intelligence agencies, it will require even more personal guardians to guard the guardians. Most of all, in an ideologically charged climate, it will require a West German political and intellectual Establishment that has not existed since Adenauer retired as chancellor in 1963, a leadership that gives the best and brightest Germans a true sense of democratic mission.

In the West, people in and close to the intelligence agencies are scared. Given the skill and diligence of Soviet espionage, the known and unknown numbers of Soviet agents and agent handlers around, the raggedness of Western security measures, the active hostility of respectable people to Western intelligence and counterintelligence and the stupidity of the political and intellectual Establishment about the Soviet Union, they sense that a large-scale Soviet penetration of Western capitals exists. They expect the cancer to show up in other vital places, far more malignantly than the West German and the Walker symptoms. □